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Abstract
In this paper, I analyze the ability of monetary and macroprudential policies to stabilize both
the macroeconomy and nancial markets under two di¤erent scenarios: short and long-term rates.
I develop and solve a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that features a
housing market, borrowers and savers. Borrowers can access credit markets through their housing
collateral. I consider two alternative ways of introducing a macroprudential approach to enhance
nancial stability: one in which monetary policy, using the interest rate as an instrument, responds to
credit growth; and a second one in which the macroprudential instrument is instead the loan-to-value
ratio (LTV). Results show that monetary and macroprudential policies are less e¤ective with long-
term rates. However, in the short-term case, monetary policy can achieve the nancial stability goal
only at the expense of higher macroeconomic volatility. If the macroprudential policy is implemented
using an LTV rule, nancial stability improves signicantly with short-term rates but just marginally
with long-term ones.
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" In my remarks, I will argue that monetary policy faces signicant limitations as a tool to promote
nancial stability [:::] If monetary policy is not to play a central role in addressing nancial stability
issues, this task must rely on macroprudential policies [:::] But experience with such tools remains
limited, and we have much to learn to use these measures e¤ectively". Chair Janet L. Yellen, July 2,
2014.
1 Introduction
The ability of monetary policy to a¤ect the economy has been the center of macroeconomic research in
recent years. Both theoretical and empirical work has focused on studying the channels and the strength
of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We know now that there are some circumstances under
which monetary policy looses its power as a tool to stabilize the macroeconomy. In the aftermath of the
nancial crisis we understand that monetary policy has its limits and that it is not only macroeconomic
stability what matters. In recent times, the focus of policy and academic discussions has been how
to ensure a more stable nancial system: a macroprudential approach to prevent the economy from
situations in which problems in the nancial sector are transmitted to the real sector and vice-versa.
However, it is debatable whether monetary policy alone can achieve this goal; it may need the help of
other tools to avoid excessive credit growth.
Along the years, new experiences have revealed that the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy may depend
on structural factors in the economy. For example, mortgage interest rates adjust not only to changes
in short-term interest rates but also to longer-term ones. Institutional features make that the prevalent
rate in the economy is short or long term. For instance, regulation may make that institutions switch
towards longer-term, xed-rate mortgage loans in some countries, while they are linked to short-term
rates in some others. Long-term rates create a source of interest rate sluggishness, since these rates are
slower to change. These features may a¤ect the transmission and optimal conduct of policies. As Boivin
et al. (2010) point out, the entire expected path of interest rates, not solely the current value, inuences
asset prices and spending. Even though the monetary policy instrument is a short-term interest rate,
the monetary transmission mechanism involves the link between short and long-term interest rates. For
example, when monetary policy raises short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates also tend to
rise because they are linked to future short-term rates. Therefore, when rates are tied to longer rates,
the link between the policy rate and the retail rate is weaker. And in fact, this slow adjustment in the
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long-term interest rate may make monetary policy less e¤ective. The remaining question is the following:
Do short and long-term interest rates also a¤ect the ability of monetary and macroprudential policies to
enhance nancial stability?
In this paper, I try to shed some light on this issue. I analyze the ability of monetary policy to stabilize
nancial markets and the macroeconomy when mortgage interest rates are sluggish because they are
linked to longer-term rates. Recent literature shows that the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy to stabilize
the macroeconomy is reduced when mortgage rates are xed or tied to longer rates. Nevertheless, there
is no consensus on whether this feature has an impact on the potential of monetary and macroprudential
policies to promote nancial stability.
Most of the standard models used in central banks fail at introducing longer-term rates, they are
usually based on the e¤ects of short-term rates on the economy. However, there is some strand of the
literature, both empirical and theoretical, that introduces this feature and nds that monetary policy
is less e¤ective when long-term rates are prevalent in the economy. For instance, Kiley (2014) nds
that, empirically, for the US, the short-term interest rate has a larger inuence on economic activity. De
Bondt et al. (2005) nd that, for the Euro area, retail bank interest rates adjust not only to changes in
short-term interest rates but also to long-term rates, explaining the sluggishness of retail bank interest
rates. Thus, as they suggest, the di¤erent degree of sluggishness in the national retail markets may
introduce country asymmetries in the transmission of the single monetary policy. Reifschneider et al.
(1999) assume that movements in long-term interest rates, coming from the expected path of short-
term rates a¤ect overall nancial conditions and aggregate demand. Abbassi and Linzert (2012) nd
that part of the loss in monetary policy e¤ectiveness to money market rates during the crisis could be
attributable to uncertainty about future interest rates. Cournede et al. (2008) show that a shift towards
xed-rate assets and liabilities may have contributed to a weaker transmission of monetary policy, which
may also potentially risk nancial stability. Chen et al. (2011) nd that short-term interest rates have
more powerful e¤ects on aggregate demand than long-term ones. Rubio (2011), Calza et al. (2013),
Garriga et al. (2013), and Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2014) nd that xed-rate contracts, associated with
longer-term interest rates, imply less e¤ective monetary policy. My paper contributes to this literature
by studying how the interest-rate sluggishness caused by longer-term rates, a¤ects the e¤ectiveness of
the combination of monetary and macroprudential policies, not only to stabilize the macroeconomy but
also the nancial system.
In this paper, I build a new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with housing.
3
There are borrowers and savers in the economy. Borrowers take loans tied to the value of housing
collateral. I introduce mortgage contracts that are either short term or long term. The short-term rate
would be directly linked to the policy rate. The long-term one would be linked to expected short-term
rates. In this way, I capture the fact that movements in long-term rates mainly come from changes in
expectations about future short-term rates. In this framework, I study how the interest-rate sluggishness
that comes from longer-term rates a¤ects the e¤ectiveness and optimal design of both monetary and
macroprudential policies. Monetary policy is set by the central bank following a Taylor rule. For the
macroprudential policies I consider two options; one in which they are conducted by the central bank
with the interest rate as an instrument. That is, I include credit growth in the interest-rate rule of
the central bank. In this way, the monetary authority would have one instrument, the interest rate,
to take care of two objectives; macroeconomic and nancial stability. In the second option, there is
a macroprudential regulator that uses a countercyclical rule for the LTV as a macroprudential tool.1
Under this rule, the LTV would be the instrument of the macroprudential regulator and would react to
credit growth. In this way, if the economy is, for instance, entering a credit boom, the LTV will be cut,
thus restricting credit in the economy and avoiding excessive credit growth. This rule, which resembles
a Taylor rule for monetary policy, serves as a proxy for the macroprudential instruments that have been
used by some institutions.
Within this setting, in order to assess the e¤ectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policies to
stabilize the economy, I compute policy frontiers, also known as Taylor curves. I nd that when interest
rates are not sluggish, monetary policy is more stabilizing because there is a one-for-one link between
the policy rate and the borrowing rate. With respect to macroprudential policies, their e¤ectiveness will
also depend on the sluggishness in the interest rate pass-through, since their interaction with monetary
policy will have an e¤ect on nancial stability. Results show that monetary policy is e¤ective to stabilize
the nancial system only with short-term rates but compromising macroeconomic stability. In the case
of a macroprudential regulator that uses the LTV as an instrument, I show that it will also be more
e¤ective for nancial stability purposes if interest rates are short term.
Then, I analyze how the optimality of monetary and macroprudential policies changes depending on
whether retail rates are linked to short or longer-term rates. I dene optimal policy as the one that
1LTV rules have become particularly popular. See for instance, Gruss and Sgherri (2009) analyse the welfare e¤ects of
procyclical LTV ratios in a real business cycle model with borrowing constraints. Funke and Paetz (2012) uses a non-linear
rule on the LTV and nds that it can help reduce the transmission of house price cycles to the real economy. In a similar
way, Kannan et al. (2012) examine a monetary policy rule that reacts to prices, output and changes in collateral values
with a macroprudential instrument based on the LTV.
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maximizes total welfare. Results show that including a macroprudential objective in the Taylor rule
for monetary policy does not imply much gains in terms of nancial stability in either case, short or
long-term rates. Having a separate macroprudential authority would increase nancial stability only in
the case of the short-term interest rates.
This paper relates to di¤erent strands of the literature. First, it introduces longer-term contracts
in a DSGE model in the spirit of Rubio (2011) or Calza et al. (2013). However, those studies restrict
themselves to the e¤ects of this feature on business cycles and monetary policy, without analyzing the
implications for macroprudential policies. Second, it is close to the recent macroprudential literature.
On the one hand, it relates with papers in which macroprudential policies interact with monetary policy
as in Kannan et al. (2012), Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014), and Angelini et al. (2014). However, it
explores how mortgage rates linked to longer-term rates a¤ect the implementation of macroprudential
policies. On the other hand, my paper also explores the topic of whether monetary and macroprudential
policies should be conducted by the same regulator using only one instrument and two objectives or
two regulators with two di¤erent instruments. Following the same line, Beau et al. (2012) claim that
it is preferable to have a combination of separate objectives for monetary and macroprudential policies.
Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015) also nd that monetary policy should focus on price stability while
macroprudential policy should have nancial stability as an instrument. Kannan et al. (2012) experiment
with an augmented Taylor rule and an LTV rule and nd that results depend on the source of the shock
considered. In my paper, I nd that having two separate instruments is preferred in the case of short-term
rates.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents the modelling framework. Section 3 discusses the
e¤ectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policies. Section 4 displays the optimal monetary and
macroprudential policy mix. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2 The Baseline Model
I consider an innite-horizon economy in which households consume, work and demand real estate. There
is a representative nancial intermediary that provides mortgages and accepts deposits from consumers.
Firms set prices subject to Calvo (1983)-Yun (1996) nominal rigidity. The monetary authority sets inter-
est rates endogenously, in response to ination and output, following a Taylor rule. For macroprudential
policies I consider two options; one in which it is conducted by the central bank, which uses the interest
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rate to take care of nancial stability; and a second one in which a separate macroprudential authority
uses a countercyclical rule on the LTV to avoid excessive credit growth.
2.1 The Consumers Problem
There are two types of consumers: savers and borrowers. Borrowers can borrow from the nancial
intermediary as long as they have housing collateral to secure their debt. As in Iacoviello (2005), I
assume that borrowers are more impatient than savers. This assumption ensures that borrowers always
borrow as much as they are o¤ered, so that they do not save and wait until they have the funds to
self-nance their consumption. This generates an economy in which households divide into borrowers
and savers. All households derive utility from consumption, housing services (assumed proportional to
the housing stock) and leisure.
2.1.1 The Financial Intermediary
There is a nancial intermediary which accepts deposits from savers, and extends loans to borrowers. I
consider that the nancial intermediary o¤ers two di¤erent mortgage products, depending on whether
the interest rate is associated to short or longer-term rates.2
I consider a competitive framework and thus the intermediary takes the short-term interest rate as
given, coming from the policy rate set by the central bank. In order for the two types of contracts to
be o¤ered, I assume that the intermediary is indi¤erent between the two of them. Hence, the expected
discounted prots that the intermediary obtains by lending new debt in a given period at a rate tied
to longer-term rates must be equal to the expected discounted prots the intermediary would obtain by
lending at the short-term rate:3
E
1X
i=+1
i ;iRL = E
1X
i=+1
i ;iRSi 1; (1)
where t;i =

Cut
Cut+i

is the saver relevant discount factor. RSi is the short-term interest rate set by
the central bank, while RL is an interest rate associated with longer-term rates. Since the nancial
intermediary is owned by the savers, their stochastic discount factor is known and it is applied to the
2 In countries where FRMs are most extensively used, nancial intermediaries pass on the loans to investors with long-
term liabilities (such as pension funds and life-insurance companies). Short-term deposits are predominantly used to nance
mortgages in countries where ARMs are commonly used. These institutional features are out of the scope of this paper.
3The long-term rate loan is priced following this non-arbitrage condition, not by applying the prices of zero-coupon
bonds to the future cash ows from the new loan.
6
nancial intermediarys problem.4
We can obtain the equilibrium value of RL from expression (1):
RL =
E
1P
i=+1
i ;iRSi 1
E
1P
i=+1
i ;i
: (2)
Equation (2) states that, for every new debt issued at date  , RL is equal to a discounted average of
future short-term interest rates, capturing the fact that long-term interest rates moves with changes on
future expected short-term interest rates.5
As noted above, if any, prots from nancial intermediation are rebated to the savers every period.
2.1.2 Savers
Savers maximize:
max E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCt + j lnHt   (Lt)



; (3)
where E0 is the expectation operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and Ct, Ht and Lt are consumption
at t, the stock of housing and hours worked, respectively; 1= (   1) is the labor supply elasticity,  > 0
and j > 0 represents the weight of housing in the utility function.
The budget constraint is:
Ct + qtHt + bt  qtHt 1 + wtLt + Rt 1bt 1
t
+ Ft + St; (4)
where qt is the real housing price and wt is the real wage for savers. These can buy houses or sell them
at the current price qt. I assume zero housing depreciation for simplicity. As we will see, this group will
choose not to borrow at all; they are the savers in this economy. bt is the amount they save. They receive
interest Rt 1 for their savings. t is ination in period t. St and Ft are lump-sum prots received from
the rms and the nancial intermediary, respectively. We can think of these consumers as the wealthy
agents in the economy, who own the rms and the nancial intermediary.
4Calza et al. (2010) also have a model in which the nancial intermediary o¤ers xed and variable-rate mortgages.
However, in their model, the two types of mortgages do not coexist. For them, the xed-rate loan is a two-period contract
while the variable-rate is one period.
5We could also interpret the short-term rate as variable-rate loans. However, in the real world, variable-rate mortgages
are also long-term loans. That is, both loans are amortized over a long period of time. The only di¤erence is that interest
payments on adjustable-rate mortgages are variable. In the model variable-rate mortgages are modeled as one-period loans.
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The rst-order conditions for this unconstrained group are:
1
Ct
= Et

Rt
t+1Ct+1

; (5)
wt = (Lt)
 1Ct; (6)
j
Ht
=
1
Ct
qt   Et 1
Ct+1
qt+1: (7)
Equation (5) is the Euler equation for consumption, equation (6) is the labor-supply condition, and
equation (7) is the Euler equation for housing. This states that, at the margin, the benets from
consuming housing must be equal to the costs.
2.1.3 Borrowers
Borrowers and savers are di¤erent in the way they discount the future; borrowers are more impatient
than savers, so that their discount factor is lower. As well, borrowers can access nancial markets using
housing collateral, that is,the amount they borrow is proportional to the value of their stock of housing:
Et
Rit
t+1
ebt  ktEtqt+1 eHt; (8)
where kt represents a proxy for the loan-to-value ratio and, as we will see, it is the instrument of
the macroprudential authority.6 As we have seen with the problem of the nancial intermediary, the
superscript i = S;L indicates the fact that rates can be short or long term. By denition, RSt = Rt:
Borrowers maximize their lifetime utility function:
max E0
1X
t=0
et
0@ln eCt + j ln eHt  
eLt

1A ; (9)
subject to the budget constraint:
eCt + qt eHt + Rit 1ebt 1
t
 qt eHt 1 + ewteLt +ebt; (10)
6The assumption of di¤erent discount factors is crucial for the collateral equation to be binding and therefore, for there
to be both borrowers and savers in the economy.
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and (8).
The rst-order conditions for borrowers are:
1eCt = eEt
 
Rit
t+1 eCt+1
!
+ tR
i
t; (11)
ewt = eLt 1 eCt; (12)
jeHt = 1eCt qt   eEt
 
1eCt+1 qt+1
!
  tktEt (qt+1t+1) : (13)
These rst-order conditions di¤er from the ones of the savers. In the case of borrowers, the Lagrange
multiplier on the collateral constraint (t) appears in equations (11) and (13). From the Euler equation
for consumption of savers, we know that R = 1= in steady state. If we combine this result with the
Euler equation for consumption of borrowers we have that  =

   e = eC > 0 in the steady state.
This means that equation (8) holds with equality in the steady state. Since we log-linearize the model
around the steady state and assume that uncertainty is low, we can generalize this result to o¤-steady-
state dynamics. Then, we can say that this equation is always binding, so that borrowers borrow the
maximum amount they are allowed to and savers are never in debt.7
Given the borrowing amount implied by (8) at equality, consumption for borrowers can be determined
by their ow of funds:
eCt = ewteLt +ebt + qt  eHt 1   eHt  Rit 1ebt 1
t
; (14)
and the rst-order condition for housing becomes:
jeHt = 1eCt

qt   ktEt (qt+1t+1)
Rit

  eEt 1eCt+1 (1  kt) qt+1
!
: (15)
7This is a typical assumption for this kind of models. See Iacoviello (2005), Appendix C for a detailed analysis of when
do constraints bind.
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2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of identical nal goods producers that aggregate intermediate goods according to
the production function
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
; (16)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The nal good rm chooses
Yt (z) to minimize its costs, resulting in demand of intermediate good z:
Yt (z) =

Pt(z)
Pt
 "
Yt: (17)
The price index is then given by:
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (z)
1 " dz
 1
" 1
: (18)
Market clearing for the nal good requires:
Yt = Ct = Ct + eCt:
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005), intermediate
goods are produced according to the production function:
Yt (z) = AtLt (z)
 eLt (z)(1 ) ; (19)
where  2 [0; 1] measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor. This Cobb-Douglas production
function implies that labor e¤orts of borrowers and savers are not perfect substitutes. This specication
is analytically tractable and allows for closed-form solutions for the steady state of the model. This
assumption can be economically justied by the fact that savers are the managers of the rms and their
wage is higher than the one of the borrowers.8
8 It could also be interpreted as the savers being older than the borrowers, therefore more experienced. Experimenting
with a production function in which hours are substitutes leads to very similar results in terms of model dynamics. Under
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At represents technology and it follows the following autoregressive process:
log (At) = A log (At 1) + uAt; (20)
where A is the autoregressive coe¢ cient and uAt is a normally distributed shock to technology.
Labor demand is determined by:
wt =
1
Xt

Yt
Lt
; (21)
ewt = 1
Xt
(1  ) YteLt ; (22)
where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.9
The price-setting problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun setting. An
intermediate good producer sells its good at price Pt (z) ; and 1  ;2 [0; 1] ; is the probability of being
able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price P t (z) solves:
1X
k=0
()k Et

t;k

P t (z)
Pt+k
  "= ("  1)
Xt+k

Y t+k (z)

= 0: (23)
The aggregate price level is then given by:
Pt =
h
P 1 "t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 "
i1=(1 ")
: (24)
Using (23) and (24) ; and log-linearizing, we can obtain a standard forward-looking New Keynesian
Phillips curve bt = Etbt+1 ekbxt+ut, that relates ination positively to future ination and negatively
to the markup ( ek  (1  ) (1  ) =). ut is a normally distributed cost-push shock.10
the Cobb-Douglas specication each household has mass one.  is a constant that represents the labor-income share of the
patient household and Lt are total hours worked by the patient household. In the alternative specication, one needs to
dene the fraction of agents in the population, say ! is the fraction of savers. Then, !Lt represents the total hours worked
by the patient household. Therefore, both specications are very similar but, while  represents the economic size of savers,
! is its absolute size.
9Symmetry across rms allows us to write the demands without the index z:
10Variables with a hat denote percent deviations from the steady state.
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2.3 Aggregate Variables
Economy-wide aggregates are: Ct  Ct + eCt; Lt  Lt + eLt; Ht  Ht + eHt: In this model, aggregate
supply of housing is xed, so that market clearing requires: Ht = H:11
2.4 Monetary Policy
The model is closed with a Taylor Rule to describe the conduct of monetary policy by the central bank:
Rt = 
(1+)
t (Yt=Yt 1)
y R; (25)
where ; y > 0 measure the response of interest rates to current ination and output growth, respec-
tively. R is the steady-state interest rate.
2.5 Modelling Macroprudential Policies
For the macroprudential policy, I will consider two options to be compared. The rst one is an extended
Taylor rule so that the interest rate, apart from responding to ination and output, also responds to
credit growth. The second one would be a rule on the LTV, so that this variable responds to credit
growth.
The rst case represents a world in which macroprudential and monetary policies are integrated
and assigned to the central bank, which uses just one instrument, the interest rate, to achieve both
macroeconomic and nancial stability. In this case, the objectives of monetary policy should be expanded
to include nancial stability. The second case would correspond to a situation in which macroprudential
supervision should involve a regulatory agency, di¤erent from the central bank or within the central
bank, that uses a di¤erent instrument, namely the LTV, for macroprudential purposes.
2.5.1 Macroprudential Taylor Rule
Here, I am considering the case in which the central bank is adopting a macroprudential approach and
taking care of credit variables. Thus, I extend the Taylor rule to not only respond to ination and output
growth but also to credit growth.
Rt = 
(1+)
t (Yt=Yt 1)
y (bt=bt 1)b R: (26)
11This assumption provides an easy way to specify the supply of housing and have variable prices. A two-sector model
with production of housing would not generate qualitatively di¤erent results.
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Therefore, we are giving the central bank a way to implement a macroprudential policy. Notice that
increasing the interest rate when credit is growing mean restricting credit booms in the economy, since
debt repayments are going up. Then, in this case, the goals of the central bank are extended to also
include nancial stability.
2.5.2 LTV Rule
As an approximation for a realistic macroprudential policy, I consider a Taylor-type rule for the loan-to-
value ratio. In standard models, the LTV ratio is a xed parameter which is not a¤ected by economic
conditions. However, we can think of regulations of LTV ratios as a way to moderate credit booms.
When the LTV ratio is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint is binding,
borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and
therefore restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. Recent research on macroprudential policies
has proposed Taylor-type rules for the LTV ratio so that it reacts inversely to variables such that the
growth rates of GDP, credit growth, the credit-to-GDP ratio or house prices. These rules can be a simple
illustration of how a macroprudential policy could work in practice. Here, I assume that there exists a
macroprudential Taylor-type rule for the LTV ratio, so that it responds to credit growth:
kt = kSS (bt=bt 1) 
k
b ; (27)
where kSS is the steady-state value for the loan-to-value ratio. kb  0 measures the response of the
loan-to-to value to credit growth. This kind of rule would deliver a lower LTV ratio in booms, when
credit is growing, therefore restricting credit in the economy and avoiding a credit boom derived from
good economic conditions.
2.6 Parameter Values
For calibration, I consider the following parameter values: The discount factor, , is set to 0:99 so
that the annual interest rate is 4% in the steady state. The discount factor for borrowers, e, is set to
0:98. Lawrance (1991) estimates discount factors for poor consumers between 0:95 and 0:98 at quarterly
frequency. Results are not sensitive to di¤erent values within this range. This value of e is low enough
to endogenously divide the economy into borrowers and savers. The weight of housing on the utility
function, j, is set to 0:1 in order for the ratio of housing wealth to GDP in the steady state to be
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consistent with the data. This value of j implies a ratio of approximately 1.40, in line with the Flow of
Funds data.12 I set  = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1:13 For the loan-to-value
ratio, I consider kSS = 0:9, consistent with the evidence that in the last years borrowers took credit of
more than 90% of the value of their house, on average.14 The labor income share of savers, , is set to
0:64, following the estimate in Iacoviello (2005). I pick a value of 6 for ", the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods. This value implies a steady-state markup of 1:2. The probability of not
changing prices, , is set to 0:75, implying that prices change every four quarters. For the benchmark
Taylor Rule parameters I use  = 0:5; y = 0:5: These values are consistent with the original parameter
proposed by Taylor in 1993. Table 1 shows a summary of the parameter values.
Table 1: Parameter Values
 :99 Discount Factor for Saverse :98 Discount Factor for Borrowers
j :1 Weight of Housing in Utility Function
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
kSS :9 Loan-to-value ratio
 :64 Labor share for Savers
X 1:2 Steady-state markup
 :75 Probability of not changing prices
A :9 Technology persistence
 :5 Ination Parameter in Taylor Rule
y :5 Output Parameter in Taylor Rule
3 The E¤ectiveness of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies
In this section, I study the e¤ectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policies to stabilize the macro-
economy and the nancial system, both when interest rates are linked to short and long-term rates. In
order to do that, I compute policy e¢ ciency frontiers, also known as Taylor curves. These curves
12See Table B.100. In this model, consumption is the only component of GDP. To make the ratio comparable with
the data I multiply it by 0.6, which is approximately what nondurable consumption and services account for in the GDP,
according to the data in the NIPA tables.
13Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) show
that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimates could have a downward bias of 50%.
14 In the US, the average LTV ratio exceeds 90% for the period 1973-2006. See the data from the Federal Housing Finance
Board.
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represent the trade-o¤s that policy makers face when trying to achieve their objectives.
In the standard new Keynesian model, in which macroprudential policies are not considered, the
central bank aims at minimizing the variability of output and ination to reduce the distortion introduced
by nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition. That is, the loss function that the central bank faces
is LCB = 2 + y
2
y , where 
2
 and 
2
y are the variances of ination and output, respectively. y  0,
represents the relative weight of the central bank to the stabilization of output. This loss function
is consistent with a Taylor rule in which the interest rate responds to ination and output, namely,
equation (25) : In this framework, monetary policy e¢ ciency is assessed through a Taylor curve that
shows, given di¤erent parameters of the Taylor rule, the parameter combinations that deliver the lower
output and ination variability. Therefore, a Taylor curve which is closer to the origin would represent
a more e¢ cient monetary policy.15
However, in models with collateralized debt, there are two types of distortions: price rigidities and
credit frictions. This creates conicts and trade-o¤s between borrowers and savers. Savers may prefer
policies that reduce the price stickiness distortion. However, borrowers may prefer a scenario in which
the pervasive e¤ect of the collateral is softened. Borrowers operate in a second-best situation and cannot
smooth consumption by themselves. Thus, a more stable nancial system would provide them with
a setting in which their consumption pattern is smoother. Therefore, nancial stability may also be
a policy objective. In this model, borrowers sign mortgages to buy houses, the asset of the model.
Therefore, the nancial system can be proxied by the amount of borrowing that takes place. Within this
framework, I propose a measure for nancial stability: a low variability of borrowing. In this sense, a
lower variance of borrowing would imply a more stable nancial system: if the variance of borrowing is
lower, credit is smoother. There are studies that show that, in these kind of models, nancial variables
should be included in the loss function that the policy maker aims at minimizing.16 Angelini et al.
(2012) assume that the loss function in the economy also contains nancial variables, namely borrowing
variability, as a proxy for nancial stability. Then, there would be a loss function for the economy
that would include not only the variability of output and ination but also the variability of borrowing:
LCB = 
2
 + y
2
y + 
2
b ; where 
2
b is the variance of borrowing.
17 This augmented loss function would be
consistent with an extended Taylor rule that takes nancial variables into account in the setting of the
15See for instance Iacoviello (2005) that evaluates with a policy frontier a Taylor rule responding to house prices.
16Andrés et al. (2013) nd that optimal monetary policy may involve a trade-o¤ between the stabilization of ination,
output gap, consumption gap and the distribution of the collateral asset between constrained and unconstrained consumers.
17This loss function would be consistent with studies that make a second-order approximation of the utility of individuals
and nd that it di¤ers from the standard case by including nancial variables.
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interest rate, that is, equation (26) :
However, Svensson (2012) argues that conducting monetary policy and nancial-stability policy in
an integrated way may be inappropriate, since monetary policy and nancial-stability policy are distinct
and separate policies, with di¤erent objectives and di¤erent instruments. Svensson (2012) suggests that
monetary policy should be in charge of price stability while macroprudential policy needs to address
nancial stability. In this case, the central bank and the macroprudential regulator are di¤erent and have
separate objectives; macroeconomic and nancial stability, respectively. Therefore, their loss functions
would be LCB = 2 + y
2
y and LMP = 
2
b : In this case, monetary policy would be conducted by the
central bank through the standard Taylor rule (equation 25), while the macroprudential policy would
be conducted by a regulatory agency following equation (27).
In the following subsection, I compute policy frontiers to assess the e¢ ciency of monetary and
macroprudential policies under short and long-term rates. I do the analysis for the three di¤erent cases
described above:
1. A benchmark case, with no macroprudential policies, in which monetary policy aims at minimizing
output and ination variability and follows the Taylor rule represented by equation (25)
2. Monetary policy aims at minimizing output, ination and credit variability and follows the aug-
mented macroprudential Taylor rule in equation (26)
3. Monetary policy aims at minimizing output and ination variability while macroprudential policy
minimizes credit variability, following the Taylor rule in equation (25) and the LTV rule in equation
(27), respectively
3.1 Policy E¢ ciency Frontiers
Case 1: Monetary Policy minimizes output and ination variability Figure 1 shows the
output and ination variability frontier for the cases in which rates are tied to short and longer-term
interest rates, respectively. This curve shows the trade-o¤ that the central bank faces when trying to
stabilize both output and ination at the same time. Thus, given di¤erent parameters of the Taylor
rule, it displays the combination that delivers the lower output and ination variability. Therefore, as
mentioned above, a Taylor curve which is closer to the origin means more e¢ cient monetary policy.
We see that when rates are linked to longer-term rates the e¢ ciency frontier is further away from the
origin. This means that, with long-term rates, monetary policy is less e¤ective in stabilizing output and
16
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Figure 1: Taylor Curve. Monetary Policy aims at minimizing ination and output variability
ination because the link between monetary policy rates and e¤ective rates is weaker. This creates a
slower adjustment that prevents monetary policy from being as e¤ective to stabilize output and ination.
Case 2: Monetary Policy minimizes output, ination and credit variability For the
second case, I plot an extended e¢ ciency frontier that includes the three objectives that the policy
maker aims at minimizing: variability of output, variability of ination and variability of borrowing.
The last variable would represent nancial stability.
Figures 2 and 3 present this augmented policy frontier which is three-dimensional on the variability
of output, ination and borrowing. The variability of output and ination corresponds to the standard
objectives of the central bank, while the third one would be an extra macroprudential objective. Figure 2
shows the frontiers for the short-term scenario, while gure 3 does it for the long-term rate. In each case,
I compare the macroprudential Taylor rule with the standard one to see if adding the macroprudential
objective to monetary policy increases nancial stability. We see that for the short-term scenario,
the curve corresponding to the augmented Taylor rule is further away from the ination and output
variability axes, but it is reecting lower values of credit variability. This means that there are gains in
term of nancial stability, at the expense of macroeconomic stability. This suggests that adding this new
objective to monetary policy helps stabilize the nancial system but creates conicts with macroeconomic
17
variables, as Svensson (2012) suggested. This is a common result in the macroprudential literature.18
Nevertheless, gure 3 displays the same information for the long-term rate. Here, we can observe that
including nancial variables in the Taylor rule and extending the objectives of the central bank to also
include nancial stability does not represent an improvement in terms of stability, neither nancial nor
macroeconomic, since the two curves are virtually identical. With long-term interest rates, given the
slow adjustment process that it creates, monetary policy is not e¤ective to achieve this third objective
either.
We can conclude for this case that, with short-term rates, monetary policy is not only e¤ective
to stabilize the macroeconomy but also to stabilize the nancial system, by extending its objectives.
However, with longer-term rates, monetary policy is not e¤ective for any of the three objectives.
Case 3: Monetary Policy minimizes output and ination variability, Macroprudential
Policy minimizes credit variability In this case, monetary policy behaves in the standard way,
taking care of macroeconomic stability. Thus, the Taylor curve that we should take into consideration
for output and ination variability is still gure 1. In order to show the e¤ects of the LTV rule on
nancial stability, I display gure 4, in which I present how credit variability changes when increasing the
aggressiveness of the macroprudential rule, that is, increasing the reaction parameter to credit growth in
equation (27). We see that in this case, although we start from a situation with more nancial instability
in the long-term scenario, even with long-term rates, macroprudential policy is somewhat e¤ective to
stabilize the nancial system but not as e¤ective as in the short-term case. When a macroprudential
regulator takes care of nancial stability, this objective can be achieved in both cases. However, the
interaction between the macroprudential rule and monetary policy is more e¤ective when there are
short-term rates in the economy because the policy rate has immediate e¤ects.
Therefore, for all cases analyzed, policies, both monetary and macroprudential, are less e¤ective
with long-term rates. With long-term interest rates, monetary policy is less e¤ective to stabilize the
macroeconomy and not e¤ective at all to stabilize the nancial system, even if including this objective
as an extra policy goal. If the macroprudential policy is implemented by an external regulator, it can
achieve some improvement in terms of nancial stability, which is more signicant in the short-term case
because the interactions between macroprudential and monetary policies are more e¤ective.
18This is a typical result found in the literature. Results are in line, for example, with Gelain et al. (2013) which show that
while macroprudential policies can stabilize some variables, they can magnify the volatility of others, especially ination.
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Figure 4: Credit variability implied by an LTV macroprudential rule
4 Optimal Policy
In this section, I analyze the optimality of monetary and macroprudential policies for both short and
longer-term rates.19 I nd the optimal parameters of the di¤erent rules that maximize welfare and are
most benecial for both macroeconomic and nancial stability.20 In particular, given a grid of possible
parameters for the LTV and the Taylor rule (both the standard and the macroprudential one), I perform
a search that maximizes welfare, subject to determinacy requirements.21 Table 2 displays the optimal
parameters both for the short and the long-term rate cases:
19 I dene optimal policy as the one that maximizes total welfare.
20 I solve the model by using a second-order approximation to the structural equations for given policy and then evaluatie
welfare using this solution. I do this for borrowers and savers separately and then aggregate the individual welfare.
21The Taylor Principle also holds in the model with collateral constraints, for (1 + )  1 , there is indeterminacy.
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Table 2: Optimal Policy
Short-Term Rate Long-Term Rate
TR Macropru TR LTV Rule TR Macropru TR LTV Rule
(1 + ) 2:2 2:2 2 1:1 1:1 1:1
y 1:4 1:1 1:4 0 0 0
kb     0:3     0:01
b   0:3     0:01  
Volatilities
 0:20 0:15 0:23 0:87 0:99 0:87
y 1:93 2:00 1:88 2:25 2:30 2:26
b 1:46 1:54 1:17 60:55 70:12 60:57
Results in Table 2 display the optimal policy parameters and the volatilities implied by each com-
bination, to assess the e¤ectiveness of this specic policy to stabilize both the macroeconomy and the
nancial system. The table is divided into two parts corresponding to the short and the long-term rate
case.
The rst column in each case, represents the benchmark, since it does not include macroprudential
policies. In this column we can nd the optimal parameters of the standard Taylor rule for monetary
policy, that is, the reaction parameters for ination and output. We see that for the short-term case, it is
optimal for monetary policy to respond more aggressively both against ination and output. However, for
long-term rates, since the link between the interest rate and the macroeconomic variables is weaker, it is
not optimal for monetary policy to respond strongly to any of the variables because in any case, the e¤ect
of nominal rates on the economy is slower because they take more time to adjust. In terms of stability,
we see from the volatilities that a greater stability, both macroeconomic and nancial, is achieved with
short-term rates. Macroeconomic stability is achieved because monetary policy is more e¤ective with
short-term rates. With long-term rates, since the nominal rate is linked to future expectations, the real
rate depends more strongly on current ination, and this one is more volatile than in the short-rate case
because of the lack of e¤ectiveness of monetary policy. Therefore, current real rates are more volatile.
All this generates greater nancial instability as compared to the short-term scenario.
In the second column of results, I nd the optimal parameters for the augmented Taylor rule, that
is, the macroprudential Taylor rule in which the interest rate does not only respond to ination and
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output but also to credit growth. Results show that, for both the short and the long-term interest
rate, although it is optimal to respond to credit growth, the optimal monetary policy is very similar
to the case in which the central bank only responds to ination and output. However, in neither case,
greater nancial stability is achieved. We saw in the previous section with the policy frontiers that for
the short-term scenario, nancial stability was achieved only at the expense of higher macroeconomic
stability. Therefore, if monetary policy does not want to compromise ination and output variability, it
cannot achieve its new extra goal. For the long-term case, as we also saw previously, monetary policy is
not e¤ective either to achieve nancial stability, even if responding to credit growth.
Finally, the third column in Table 2 presents the optimized monetary policy when it interacts with an
LTV rule. We see that, for the short-term scenario, the optimal response for monetary policy is still very
similar to the other cases analyzed. However, the macroprudential LTV rule complements the role of
monetary policy and both interacting together manage to achieve a more stable nancial scenario, with
similar macroeconomic volatilities. For the long-term rates, the optimal response is also very similar to
the benchmark case and there is no much improvement in terms of macroeconomic of nancial stability
because, since rates take longer to adjust, the interaction between both policies is not as e¤ective as in
the short-term case.
Results from Table 2 convey what we learned in the previous section. Including a macroprudential
objective in the Taylor rule for monetary policy does not signify much gains in terms of nancial stability
in either case. Having a separate macroprudential authority, would increase nancial stability only in
the case of the short-term interest rates because of the interaction between the LTV rule and monetary
policy.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I study the ability of monetary and macroprudential policies to a¤ect nancial markets
and the macroeconomy, both when interest rates in the economy are tied to short or longer-term rates.
I develop a New Keynesian general equilibrium model with housing to analyze the combined e¤ects
of macroprudential and monetary policies under these two scenarios. There are borrowers and savers.
Borrowers use their housing collateral to access credit markets.
I propose two types of macroprudential policies. The rst one is a Taylor rule for the interest rate,
in which rates would respond not only to ination and output but also to credit growth. In this case,
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both monetary and macroprudential policies would be implemented by the central bank with a single
instrument, the interest rate. The second one is a Taylor-type rule on the LTV. In this case, monetary
and macroprudential policies would be implemented separately. The LTV would be the instrument of
the macroprudential regulator, responding to credit growth.
In order to assess the e¤ectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policies, I perform a policy
frontier analysis. First, I compute Taylor curves for a standard monetary policy which aims at minimizing
ination and output variability and I nd that when rates are linked to the short-term policy rate,
monetary policy is more e¤ective to stabilize the macroeconomy. Then, I extend the objectives of the
central bank to also include nancial stability and I calculate augmented Taylor curves that include
these three objectives. Results show that, for the short-term case, monetary policy can achieve higher
nancial stability but only at the expense of more variability in the macroeconomic variables. For the
long-term case, monetary policy is not e¤ective to stabilize nancial markets. Finally, I analyze the
ability of a macroprudential LTV rule to enhance nancial stability. I nd that this rule is e¤ective for
this purpose, signicantly for the short-term scenario and just marginally for longer-term rates.
In light of these results, I analyze the optimal monetary and macroprudential policy that maximizes
welfare, both when rates are short term and when they are longer term. To start with, I perform the
analysis for the benchmark case, the one that does not include macroprudential policies and monetary
policy only cares about macroeconomic stability. For the short-term rate scenario, it is optimal for
monetary policy to respond both against ination and output. However, for longer-term rates, since the
link between the interest rate and the macroeconomy is weaker, it is not optimal for monetary policy to
respond to any of the two variables. A greater stability, both macroeconomic and nancial, is achieved
with short-term rates. Then, I study the optimality implications of including credit growth directly in
the Taylor rule for the interest rate. For the short-term case, the optimal parameters do not deliver a
situation with higher nancial stability because that would only happen compromising macroeconomic
stability. For longer-term rates, monetary policy is not e¤ective to stabilize nancial markets either.
The last case I study is the optimality of monetary policy interacting with the LTV rule. For short-term
rates, this option is e¤ective to improve nancial stability. However, it is not e¤ective with longer-term
rates.
In conclusion, both monetary and macroprudential policies are less e¤ective with long-term rates. In
the long-term case, monetary policy is less e¤ective to stabilize the macroeconomy and not e¤ective at
all to stabilize the nancial system, even if including nancial stability as an extra policy goal. If the
23
macroprudential policy is implemented using an LTV rule, nancial stability improves with short-term
rates but the improvement is just marginal with longer-term ones.
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